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THE SOLUTION TO THE
FILIBUSTER PROBLEM:
PUTTING THE ADVICE BACK IN ADVICE
AND CONSENT
INTRODUCTION
Today, hostility reigns in Washington. This is so, less than
three years after a period of virtually unparalleled national unity
following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Now, with
Congress and the nation almost evenly divided politically, rela-
tions between the Republicans and Democrats in Washington are
as discordant as ever. As one pundit put it, "[c]ynicism is back in
full force. Extraordinary political partisanship and acrimony are
back."' This "extraordinary political partisanship and acrimony"
is best evidenced by the recent wranglings over several nominees
for prestigious and powerful federal courts of appeals appoint-
ments. In the past year, Democrats successfully filibustered six of
President Bush's nominees 2 and the Republicans responded with
an all-night "talkathon" meant to publicly condemn the Democ-
rats' filibusters. 3 Refusing to be intimidated, the Democrats suc-
cessfully filibustered three more nominations4 and Democrat Sena-
tor Tom Harkin, from Iowa, mocked the talkathon by holding up a
sign to reporters and Republicans that read "I'll be home watching
'The Bachelor."
5
I Sharon Cohen, Contentious Issues Divide Americans, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 29, 2004,
at 12 (quoting David Blankenham, president of the Institute for American Values).
2 The nominees were Mississippi Federal District Judge Charles Pickering, Alabama At-
torney General William Pryor, Texas Supreme Court Justice Priscilla Owen, United States At-
torney Miguel Estrada, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Carolyn Kuhl, and California Su-
preme Court Justice Janice Rogers Brown. See Julie Hirschfield Davis, Bypassing Congress,
Bush Taps Pickering, BALT. SUN, Jan. 17, 2004, at 1A.
3 Nick Anderson, Senators Pull an All-Nighter over Judicial Confirmations, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2003, at A21.
4 The nominees were Priscilla Owen, Janice Rogers Brown, and Carolyn Kuhl. See An-
drew Mollison, Democrats Block 3 Bush Nominees, ATL. J.-CONST., Nov. 15, 2003, at 6C.
5 Senate Set for All-Nighter over Bush's Judicial Nominees, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 13, 2003, at
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Additionally, Republican staff members reportedly hacked
into Democratic staff members' computers, stealing confidential
information regarding Democratic strategies for fighting the con-
firmation of certain Bush nominees.6 These acts, whether silly,
potentially illegal, or sanctioned by the Constitution,7 have fueled
the flame of discord and the Democratic minority in the Senate
will likely answer by blocking more nominees when the Senate
reconvenes.
8
This Comment proposes a much needed solution to the fili-
buster problem. Part I lays a foundation by explaining the process
used by the Democrats to filibuster the six nominees and provides
an overview of the filibuster problem. Part II examines three pro-
posals to change the Senate Rules: (1) the "Bush Plan," which is
an ostensibly simple time limit for votes on nominees; 9 (2) the
"Frist Plan," a gradual lowering of the number of Senators needed
to support cloture to end a filibuster; 0 and (3) the "nuclear op-
tion," a stealthy change of Senate Rules by Republican Senators
and Vice President Dick Cheney." The section concludes that
none of these changes are both politically and legally feasible.
Part III then examines claims that filibusters violate the Constitu-
tion's Appointments Clause and establishes that all three court
challenges to the filibusters fail on the merits. Finally, Part IV ar-
gues that the Republican proposals do not address the underlying
cause of the filibuster problem: the communication breakdown be-
tween the President and the Senators opposed to his nominees.
The only way to reverse the escalating political discord is to put
9.
6 Computer Hackers in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2004, at A20; see also Eric
Lichtblau, Politically Charged Case to Get Special Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2004, at
A22.
7 See U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 3 ("The President shall have the Power to fill up all Va-
cancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall
expire at the End of their next Session."). Though the purpose of this clause was to keep the
government functioning while Senators were away from the Capitol during Congressional re-
cesses, which could last up to nine months, presidents often use the power to make recess ap-
pointments to thwart the confirmation process and install nominees whose confirmation the
Senate would likely otherwise defeat. See Michael A. Carrier, Note, When Is the Senate in
Recess for Purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2204, 2206 (1994).
Frustrated by the filibusters in 2003, President Bush used his recess appointment power to ele-
vate William H. Pryor and Charles W. Pickering, Sr., to spots on the Eleventh and Fifth Circuit
Courts of Appeals respectively. See Richard Simon, Bush Frustrated by Democrats, Again
Bypasses Senate, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2004, at Al.
8 See Dana Milbank & David S. Broder, Hopes for Civility in Washington Are Dashed,
WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2004, at A01.
9 James Politi, Bush in Drive to Overhaul Judicial Confirmation Process, FIN. TIMES,
May 10, 2003, at 8.
10 David G. Savage, GOP Leader Seeks Senate Rule Change, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2003,
at A17.
I See Nuclear War on the Hill, WASH. POST, May 21, 2003, at A32.
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the advice back in "advice and consent" by allowing Senators who
oppose nominees to exercise their constitutional role as prenomi-
nation advisors.
I. THE FILIBUSTERS OF 2003
A. The Process
The Constitution requires that the Senate advise and consent
to the appointment of a president's nominee to a position on the
federal bench. 12 Generally, the Senate exercises its consent to the
appointment of a nominee via a two-step process. First, the Senate
Judiciary Committee collectively considers the merits of a candi-
date and then votes on whether to allow a floor vote, where the
entire Senate considers that nominee.1 3  Second, if the Judiciary
Committee elects to allow a floor vote, the Senate reviews the
candidate's merits and votes on the appointment.14 Under normal
circumstances appointment requires fifty-one votes. 15
A filibuster is a parliamentary technique that allows a minor-
ity of the Senate to block a floor vote indefinitely, so that the full
Senate never considers a piece of legislation or the confirmation of
a president's nominee. 16  The Standing Rules of the Senate, the
rules that the Senate has formulated to dictate its procedures, 17 al-
low unlimited debate (a filibuster), unless sixty Senators vote to
end the debate (cloture).' 8  Because cloture requires sixty votes,
many characterize a filibuster as a supermajority requirement for
confirming a nominee over the usual fifty-one-vote requirement.19
The Democrats conducted filibusters against the six Bush
nominees last year under the relatively new tracking system. 20 The
12 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
13 Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in the Fourth Circuit, 80 N.C. L. REV. 2001,
2009-10 (2002).
14 Id. at 2010.
15 Id.
16 FRANKLIN L. BURDETrE, FILIBUSTERING IN THE SENATE 5 (1940).
17 Under the Constitution, the Senate may determine its own rules for proceedings. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
18 Senate Rule XXH; see BURDETrE, supra note 16, at 5 (defining "filibuster" and "clo-
ture").
19 Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 182
(1997).
20 See SARAH BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE: FILIBUSTERING IN
THE UNITED STATES SENATE 15 (1997) (explaining that the Senate adopted the tracking system
in the 1970s to reduce time constraints imposed by filibusters). It is important to understand
that today, the filibuster is not characterized by the grandstanding Senator giving a marathon
impassioned speech, 'a la Jimmy Stewart in the movie MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON, or
Senators reading phone books all through the night. See STANLEY BACH, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., FILIBUSTERS AND CLOTURE IN THE SENATE 8 (1993); MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON
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tracking system allows the Senate "to have more than one bill [or
nomination] pending on the floor as unfinished business .... With
a two- (or more) track system, the Senate simply puts aside the
filibustered measure and moves on to other legislation., 21  The
Senators who filibustered votes on President Bush's nominees
might have done so without ever speaking on the Senate floor.22
Indeed, "[a] credible threat that 41 senators will refuse to vote for
cloture on a bill is enough to keep that bill off the floor., 23  The
tracking-system "eliminates the distinction between a filibuster
and a threat to filibuster; any credible threat to filibuster is a fili-
buster because the majority leader must regard it as such. 2 4 The
Senate Democrats' filibusters were simply commitments by at
least forty-one Senators that they would not vote to allow cloture.
Thus, the political cost to the Democrats imposed by the filibuster
is relatively low and there is very little incentive for them to
choose not to filibuster the nominees.25
B. The Filibuster Problem
Senate Democrats characterize the filibusters as necessary in
light of President Bush's refusal to work with them to find suc-
cessful nominees and his insistence on nominating whom they per-
ceive as right-wing extremists. 26 Harry M. Reid, Democratic Sena-
tor from Nevada and Senate Minority Whip, put it this way: "It's
[Bush's] way or no way .... I've never served with anyone more
uncooperative., 27  On the other hand, Republicans argue that the
six filibustered nominees are fully undeserving of their characteri-
zation by the Democrats 28 and that the Democrats, by us-
ing filibusters against Bush's judicial nominees, have "dispensed
(Columbia Pictures 1939).
21 BINDER & SMITH, supra note 20, at 15.
22 Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 201.
23 Id. at 203.
24 Id.
2 See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 20, at 15 (explaining that the tracking system mini-
mizes the political cost of filibustering).
26 Id. Democrats argue, for example, that Carolyn Kuhl advocated for granting Bob Jones
University tax-exempt status, despite its ardent racist policies. According to the filibusterers,
Janet Rogers Brown was not much better. They cite to a statement she made that referred to the
New Deal as "the triumph of our socialist revolution." Albert R. Hunt, Showtime in the Senate,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2003, at A19. Moreover, Democrats cite William Pryor's strong opposi-
tion to abortion rights, and his "attack [on] Federal laws and programs designed to guarantee
civil rights." 149 CONG. REC. S10,243, S10,230 (daily ed. July 30, 2003) (statements of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Leahy).
27 149 CONG. REC. S10,230 (daily ed. July 30, 2003) (statements of Sen. Leahy).
28 Some Republicans have charged that the Democrats' motives behind the filibusters are
based on anti-Catholic, anti-Baptist, anti-Latino, and anti-African-American bias. See Hunt,
supra note 26.
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with procedures that allow senators to exercise their constitutional
'advice and consent' function," leaving the President no option but
to exercise his power to make recess appointments and bypass the
Senate altogether.29
Not only is this political infighting inefficient, but the delay in
appointing judges to the federal bench has serious consequences
for our system of justice. President Bush recently summed up the
problems with filibusters against judicial nominees:
Dockets are overcrowded, judges are overworked, and citi-
zens are waiting too long for their cases to be heard. The re-
gional appeals courts have a 12 percent vacancy rate. And
filings in those courts have reached an all-time high, again
last year. The Sixth Circuit, which covers Ohio and Michi-
gan and Kentucky and Tennessee has four vacancies on a 16-
judge court. The D.C. Circuit has three vacancies on a 12-
judge court.... The American Bar Association has called
this an emergency situation. And the Chief Justice recently
said that these vacancies and rising caseloads threaten the
30proper functioning of federal courts ....
In addition, the filibusters deflect public attention from other seri-
ous issues and decrease the sense of political efficacy among
American citizens. These negative consequences of the filibusters
against judicial nominees are the filibuster problem.
II. THE SENATE RULES: ARE PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE SENATE
RULES A SOLUTION TO THE FILIBUSTER PROBLEM?
Republicans have suggested several alternatives to the current
Senate Rules, which allow a Senate minority to filibuster nominees
29 Adam Cohen, For Partisan Gain, Republicans Decide Rules Were Meant to Be Broken,
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2003, at A24. An exchange between President Bush and Charles
Schumer, the Democratic Senator from New York who led the charge to filibuster the six nomi-
nees, that occurred shortly after the President exercised his recess appointment power and ap-
pointed William Pryor to the Eleventh Circuit, further illustrates the way both sides spin the
facts. President Bush argued that "[a] minority of Democratic Senators has been using unprece-
dented obstructionist tactics to prevent [Pryor] and other qualified nominees from receiving up-
or-down votes... [and] [t]heir tactics are inconsistent with the Senate's constitutional responsi-
bility and are hurting our judicial system." Neil A. Lewis, Bypassing Senate for the 2nd Time,
Bush Seats Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2004, at Al. Schumer responded, arguing that "[t]he
President is on shaky ground with the hard right and is using this questionably legal and politi-
cally shabby technique to bolster himself." Id. Schumer went on to argue that "[riegularly
circumventing the advice-and-consent process is not the way to change the tone in Washington.
It's shabby and the motivation is political more than anything else." Id.
30 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Calls for Judicial Reform (May 9,
2003), at http:llwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030509-4.html. It should be
noted that the vacancy problem is a persistent one starting as far back as the beginning of the
nineteenth century. See Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Govern-
ment, 47 EMORY L.J. 527, 529-31 (1998).
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for positions on the federal bench: the "Bush Plan," whereby the
Senate would have to vote on the President's nominees within 180
days of nomination; 3' (2) the "Frist Plan," which gradually lowers
the amount of votes needed to achieve cloture;32 and (3) the "nu-
clear option," which, as the most radical of the plans, calls for the
Vice President33 to hand down a parliamentary rule declaring that
Senate Rule XXII does not apply to judicial confirmations.34 The
following analysis demonstrates that none of these plans is either
politically or legally feasible.
A. The "Bush Plan ": The 180-Day Voting Limit
In response to the first two successful filibusters against his
nominations, President Bush demanded that the Senate vote within
180 days after the nomination of a candidate for the federal
bench.35 Bush argues his plan will ensure that vacancies are filled
within one year 36 because his plan also would require that the
President choose a nominee 180 days after a vacancy is an-
nounced. Bush's plan, however, is not legally or politically feasi-
ble.
First, President Bush's plan involves changing the rules of the
Senate. Legally, the President has no legal authority to change or
demand changes to the Senate Rules. The Constitution gives this
authority exclusively to the Senate. 37  Second, however sensible
the plan may seem, it lacks the necessary Senate support for im-
plementation.38 Not only will this plan not receive the support of
the filibustering Democrats (between forty-eight and forty-six
Senators), but also it will not receive support from some Senate
Republicans who recognize the possibility that in the future, they
too might want to stall a president's nominees.39
Another problem with Bush's plan is that it might override
Rule XXII and disallow filibusters against judicial nominees alto-
gether. If adopted, the plan would require a full Senate vote within
31 Politi, supra note 9.
32 Savage, supra note 10.
33 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 ("The Vice President of the United States shall be
President of the Senate.").
34 Anne Q. Hoy, Judicial Nominee Battle Flares, Senate Panel Acts to Block Filibusters,
NEWSDAY, June 25, 2003, at A17.
35 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Calls for Judicial Reform (May 9,
2003), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05120030509-4.htmi.
36 Id.
37 See U.S. CONST. art. I § 5, ci. 2.
38 The Senate Rules require that three-fifths of the Senate, at least sixty-seven Senators,
approve any changes to the rules. See Senate Rule V.
39 In fact, the Republicans stalled on many Clinton nominees during his two terms in of-
fice.
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180 days of nomination. Since filibusters are parliamentary de-
vices that block floor votes, filibusters against nominees would
violate the Senate Rules under Bush's plan. This would effec-
tively deprive the minority from voicing its concerns about a
nominee and would likely turn both Republican and Democratic
Senators against the plan. For these reasons, Bush's plan is not
politically feasible.
B. The "Frist Plan ": Changing Senate Rules XXII and V
Senate Majority Leader, Republican Bill Frist, proposed his
own solution to the filibuster problem, but, like the Bush Plan, the
Frist Plan is neither politically nor legally feasible. Frist's plan
calls for a change to Senate Rule XXII by reducing the number of
votes required for cloture n° Senate Rule V dictates that to change
a Senate Rule, 67 Senators must approve it. 41 Frist will almost cer-
tainly not be able to receive that much support for his proposal.
So, some of Frist's supporters challenge the constitutionality of
Senate Rule V's three-fifths supermajority requirement. As this
section demonstrates, such a legal challenge will fail.
1. Rule XXI-Votes Necessary for Cloture
Senator Frist proposed a rule change that would lower the
amount of votes needed for cloture from 60 to a simple majority of
51 when a filibuster is waged against a judicial nominee.42 Under
his proposal, the required number of votes needed for cloture de-
creases after each vote. The first vote requires 60 votes for clo-
ture, the second 57 votes, the third 54 votes, and finally the fourth
vote would require 51 votes for cloture.43 Frist and his supporters
argue that this proposal allows the minority a voice and satisfies
the constitutional requirements of an up or down vote on a presi-
dent's nominee to the federal bench 44 and simple-majority rule.45
40 Press Release, Bill Frist, Frist Comments on Rule XXII on Filibuster Reform (June 5,
2003), at http://frst.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease-id=
1419&Month=6&Year=2003.
41 Senate Rule V.
42 Frist and the Filibuster-Working Around the Senate's Time-Honored Stalling Tactic
Is, and Should Remain, an Occupational Hazard for Its Leader, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
July 5, 2003, at B8.
43 Frist, supra note 40.
44 Stephen Calabresi, Pirates We Be, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2003, at A14. While this sec-
tion deals simply with the feasibility of changing Senate rules, it is important to note that im-
plied within Senator Frist's plan are the notions that the Appointments Clause requires an actual
vote on each and every nominee and that supermajority requirements are inconsistent with "ad-
vice and consent." These ideas are discussed infra Part lII.B.3 and Part mH.B.2, respectively.
45 See Bill Frist, Reforming the Judicial Confirmation Process, at http://frist.senate.gov/
index.cfm?FuseAction=Issues.Detail&Issueid=7 (last visited May 3, 2004).
2004]
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Filibustering Democrats are unlikely to embrace the Frist
Plan. Arguably, Frist's proposal strips a minority's power to block
a nominee. 46 Even Republicans may fear that when a Democrat
next holds the White House, there may be a Republican minority
in the Senate, which may be powerless to block federal bench
nominees. Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle cautioned that
Frist's plan, if adopted, would "mute characteristics that make the
Senate uniquely consultative. 47 Perhaps more illustrative of the
situation, Daschle further commented, "There's an old saying...
that 'if it ain't broke don't fix it.' It ain't broke., 48 As a result,
Frist's plan to change Rule XXII would not have the overwhelm-
ing bipartisan support necessary to pass.
2. Rule V-Votes Necessary for Senate Rule Change
Realizing there is little chance the Senate will change Rule
XXII through the political process, Frist's allies have called for
legal challenges to the Senate Rules.4 9 The most likely legal chal-
lenge is to Senate Rule V, which requires a vote of three-fifths of
the Senate for any rule change. 0 Of course, under the current
Senate Rules, changing Rule V also requires the consent of at least
sixty-seven Senators. t Consequently, changing this Rule through
the Senate would be politically infeasible due to staunch opposi-
tion from the filibustering Democrats.
Challenging Rule V in federal court will likely be unsuccess-
ful because the doctrine of justiciability precludes federal courts
from considering claims that are political questions.12  The Su-
preme Court, in Baker v. Carr,53 articulated several circumstances
where a political question exists, two of which pertain here: a tex-
tually demonstrable commitment of the issue to coordinate politi-
cal department, or the impossibility of a court's undertaking inde-
46 Frist suggests that under his plan, it would take approximately thirteen days to reach the
fourth cloture vote, when only a simple majority of Senators would need to support ending the
filibuster. Id. Thus, after thirteen days, the minority would no longer have the power to block a
vote on the nominee.
47 Anne Q. Hoy & Ken Fireman, Angry GOP Wants to Change the Rules, NEWSDAY, May
10, 2003, at A04.
48 Id.
49 See Jim Abrams, The Talk Goes on and on as Senate Has Another Sleepless Night,
MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINAL, Nov. 14, 2003, at 10A (quoting Senator Lindsey Graham, a Re-
publican from South Carolina, as threatening "to sue to change the Senate rules if Republicans
can't break the filibusters").
10 Senate Rule V.
51 Id.
52 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969).
53 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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pendent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due co-
ordinate branches of government.
54
As demonstrated below, the Constitution textually commits
the Senate's Rules to the Senate and not to the courts, and by con-
sidering the constitutionality of a Senate Rule, a court would not
show the requisite respect due to the Senate.55 The Rules of Pro-
ceedings Clause of the Constitution states, "Each House may de-
termine the Rules of its Proceedings., 56 The Constitution assigns
the Senate alone the power to make its own procedural rules.
In the case of a Rule V challenge, the Senate's enactment of
Rule V is within the scope of the Senate's rule-making authority.57
As long as the Senate is making rules for its own procedure, that
rule making is within the constitutional scope of Senate power and
any challenge to such rule making is a political question not re-
viewable by a federal court.58  Additionally, the Constitution
grants broad discretion to the Senate to determine its rules of pro-
cedure. The procedural rule-making grant of power in Article I is
permissive. Under this permissive grant, the Senate may establish
a set of formal rules if it wants to, but it is not required to do so.
Thus, the Rules of Proceedings Clause allows the Senate to adopt
no rules, informal rules, or formal rules.
When the Senate enacted Rule V, it did not transgress consti-
tutional limits imposed on the Senate's power. Some argue that
the Constitution precludes either House of Congress from enacting
supermajority requirements other than where enumerated in the
Constitution. 59  However, constitutional supermajority require-
ments do not necessarily indicate that the Constitution prohibits all
other supermajority requirements. 60 The constitutional text also
does not preclude the Senate from establishing rules requiring su-
54 Id. at 217.
55 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 226 (explaining that there are two primary
arguments as to why a challenge to Senate Rule XXII poses a political question: "One is that
such a challenge to congressional self-governance would express a lack of respect due to a
coordinate branch of government [and] [t]he other is that there is a textually demonstrable con-
stitutional commitment to Congress to make its own rules.").
56 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
57 Id.
58 Conversely, challenges arising under Article I, Section five to the following rules would
be justiciable: Senate procedural rules imposed by the President, House of Representative pro-
cedural rules imposed by the Senate, or substantive rules created by the Senate alone.
59 See, e.g., Lloyd Cutler, The Way to Kill Senate Rule XXII, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1993,
at A17.
60 Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 241; see also John 0. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105
YALE L.J. 483, 484 (1995) ("[T]he Constitution's silence on the proportion of legislators neces-
sary to pass bills is not the result of inattention to the issue. Rather, it reflects the Framers'
intent to permit the houses of the legislature to decide the question.").
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permajority votes; they do not run afoul of the Vice President's tie
breaking role, Senate quorum requirements, or the veto override
requirements.6' Supermajority requirements are also supported by
the Constitution's broad grant of procedural rule-making power to
the Senate. 62 Since the enactment of Senate Rule V does not devi-
ate from the bounds of the grant of procedural rule-making power
and does not violate other constitutional limits on Senate authority,
federal courts may not review a case challenging Rule V.
Even if a federal court held that a case challenging Rule V
was justiciable, the plaintiff would lose on the merits. Rule V is
constitutional because the Constitution grants broad discretion to
the Senate to determine its own rules of procedure, and Rule V
does not violate any constitutional limits on the Senate's power.
For these reasons, if Frist and his supporters attempt to change the
cloture voting requirements with a simple majority by challenging
the constitutionality of Rule V in federal court, they will fail.
C. The "Nuclear Option"
Some Senate Republicans have indicated that if Frist's plan
does not work, Republicans might exercise the "nuclear option. 63
Under this proposal, during the next filibuster of a judicial nomi-
nee, the Chair of the Senate would make a ruling on a point of or-
der, namely, that Rule XXII can be modified by a simple majority
in order to thwart filibusters against judicial nominees. 64 The Sen-
61 Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 241-43.
62 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 60, at 484 ("Under the Rule of Proceedings
Clause, the House may enact a rule governing its internal operations so long as the rule does not
violate another provision of the Constitution."); see also infra Part HI.B.2. The Supreme Court
has interpreted the Rules of Proceedings Clause as granting Congress broad discretion in formu-
lating rules of procedure:
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings.
It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights,
and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the house,
and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better,
more accurate or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a dif-
ferent one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make
rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always
subject to be exercised by the house, and within the limitations suggested, absolute
and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.
United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892).
63 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, GOP Acts to Break Deadlock on Judges, Senate Rules Panel
Backs 51 Votes to Halt Debate, Force Confirmation Vote, BALT. SUN, June 25, 2003, at IA.
64 Marianne Means, Estrada Right to Quit Nomination Fight, HOUSTON CHRON., Sep. 13,
2003, at 40.
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ate has previously allowed the Chair to make such a ruling;65 con-
sequently, such a ruling likely is not a violation of Senate Rules.
Legal as it may be, the nuclear option, if exercised, admittedly
would run roughshod over the present rules and the minority De-
mocrats. Many Republicans are wary of the political conse-
quences of this plan, and the political fall-out would be extraor-
dinary. Charles Schumer, Democratic Senator from New York,
and the leader in the filibusters, said about the nuclear option, "It
reminds me of a spoiled child throwing a temper tantrum. . . [the
nuclear option would] vaporize every bridge in sight-bipartisan
,,67
or otherwise. Schumer also vowed that if, and when, the Re-
publicans exercise the option, "Democrats would take very strong
action.' 68 This means that Democrats will resort to any means to
stall all Republican supported legislation.
Arguably, if the Republicans exercise the nuclear option, they
will forever change the characteristics of the Senate for the worse.
The Framers considered the Senate a higher-minded institution, the
political institution least affected by fickleness and public whim:
James Madison explained that the Constitution's framers
considered the Senate to be the great "anchor" of the gov-
ernment . . . . [T]he Senate would be a "necessary fence"
against the "fickleness and passion" that tended to influence
the attitudes of the general public and members of the House
of Representatives.69
The filibuster tempers majority rule by necessitating debate and
attention to minority view points.70  By removing this check,
65 As Anne Q. Hoy stated:
In 1977, a rules change was imposed through a ruling of the chair during a conten-
tious debate on a natural gas deregulation bill. With Walter Mondale, then vice
president, in the chair, a frustrated Sen. Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.), then majority
leader, succeeded in changing the rules to halt a filibuster that was being waged even
after the Senate had voted to invoke cloture, or limit debate.
Anne Q. Hoy, Judicial Nominee Battle Flares, Senate Panel Acts to Block Filibusters, NEWS-
DAY, June 25, 2003, at A17.
66 Savage, supra note 10.
67 Helen Dewar, GOP Votes to Break Nominee Filibusters, Democrats Appear Able to
Block Plan, WASH. POST, June 25, 2003, at A21.
68 Hoy, supra note 65.
69 U.S. Senate, September 17, 1787, Senate Created, at http://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/minute/SenateCreated.htm (last visited May 3, 2004).
70 The filibuster is more important than the Framers' envisioned. Specifically, at the time
of ratification, Senators were selected by state legislatures; today they are elected by a popular
vote. EUGENE W. HICKOK, JR., THE SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT AND JUDICIAL SELECTION
45 (1992). Also, television and the internet allow the public increased access to Senate proceed-
ings. Id. at 46. Thus, Senators have more of an incentive to mirror public opinion and are less
likely to "provide a check on public opinion ... so that the 'cool and deliberate sense' of the
community might govern." Id. at 45-46. The filibuster and other mechanisms that Senators
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which the nuclear option ultimately would do, Senate Republicans
would strip the Senate of its title as the "world's greatest debating
society" 71 and render it nothing more than a House of Representa-
tives whose members hold six-year terms. This effect, coupled
with the inevitable political fall-out from such a move, renders the
nuclear option a plan with disastrous consequences. In conclusion,
all three proposals to the Senate Rules fail to adequately solve the
filibuster problem.
III. CHALLENGING THE FILIBUSTERS IN FEDERAL COURT:
WILL CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FILIBUSTERS
IN FEDERAL COURT SOLVE THE FILIBUSTER PROBLEM?
Other than changing Senate Rules, the President, Senate Re-
publicans, and supporters of their position have proposed challeng-
ing the constitutionality of filibusters in the judicial appointments
process. These proposals focus on filibusters as they relate to the
Senate's advice and consent powers, articulated within the Ap-
pointments Clause of the Constitution. Some focus on the division
of the appointment power between the President and the Senate,
arguing that the Constitution allows the Senate to disapprove of
the President's judicial nominee only if the President has trans-
72gressed his authority in making the nomination. Others focus on
the requirements of advice and consent, arguing that the filibusters
unconstitutionally impose a supermajority requirement on judicial
confirmations or that the Appointments Clause requires a vote on
every nominee.73 This section considers the merits of such
claims 74 and concludes that the filibusters are constitutional. In the
may use to further minority rights are all the more important to "ensure not only representative
government but good government, responsible government." Id. at 46; see also BURDETrE,
supra note 16, at 9 ("The existence of filibustering in America today is evidence of a compro-
mise between the authority of the many and the rights of the few.").
71 Keep the Filibuster, Unlimited Debate Guards Against Unruly Passions, HOUSTON
CHRON., Nov. 28, 1994, at 16. Ironically, the reason the Framers initially involved the Senate in
the appointments power was their prediction that the Senate would have a tendency to consider
the merits of a nominee and be less swayed by public opinion. See THE FEDERALIST No. 76
(Alexander Hamilton).
72 See Robert J. McKeever, The United States Supreme Court 116 (1997) (explaining that
some scholars argue that "the President is the senior partner in the appointments process" and
that the Senate's "task in confirming or rejecting the President's nominee is limited to ensuring
that he or she is technically and temperamentally qualified to be a Supreme Court Justice").
73 See Judicial Watch, Inc., v. United States Senate, No. 1:03cv01066 (CKK) (D.D.C.
May 14, 2003).
74 A challenge to the filibusters themselves must be justiciable in federal court. The two
requirements of justiciability that could be raised are the standing and political question doc-
trines. Under the doctrine of standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate an injury in fact. Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). In a case challenging filibusters, there are at least two possi-
ble plaintiffs that would meet the standing requirements: the President or a rejected nominee.
The President could argue that the Senate's transgression of its Appointments Clause power
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end, such claims will fail to provide a solution to the filibuster
problem.
A. The Balance of Power-Does the Appointments Clause Require
the Senate to Defer to the President's Choice of Nominees?
As the recent debate over the Senate's filibusters against
President Bush's nominees demonstrates, the Senate wields great
power in the appointment of federal judges. However, some argue
that the Constitution really limits the Senate's ability to refuse to
confirm a president's nominee to only when the President abuses
his nominating power.75 A careful examination of the text and the
Framers' intent yields a different conclusion. The text and the his-
tory of ratification demonstrate that any size differential in share
of the appointment power between the President and the Senate is
incident to their respective functions-nominating versus advice
and consent-and not such that one party must defer to the other in
the appointment process. Consequently, the Constitution bestows
an important and significant share of the appointment power to the
Senate.76
1. The Text
The content of the Appointments Clause demonstrates that the
Framers gave neither the President nor the Senate a greater share
of the appointment power:
He shall have the Power, by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of
the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
interfered with the exercise of his Appointments Clause power, depriving him of his full consti-
tutional authority. The rejected nominee could argue that by transgressing its Appointments
Clause power, the Senate deprived her of her rightful appointment to the federal bench. See
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 138 (1803) (reviewing a nominee's challenge to
James Madison's refusal to allow him to take his seat as justice of the peace in the District of
Columbia). It can be argued that such a case does not raise a political question because the
federal court would be considering whether the Senate acted within the bounds established by
the Constitution, rather than questioning the Senate's exercise of its constitutionally granted
discretion to act. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
Is For instance, after one of his nominations was rejected by the Senate, President Nixon
complained that the Senate was overreaching and not acting like the rubber stamp that they had
for his Democratic predecessors. Letter from Richard M. Nixon to William Saxbe (March 31,
1970), reprinted in 116 CONG. REC. 10,158 (1970).
76 See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS & CONGRESS 12-13 (1997) (arguing that strong
Senate participation in the judicial appointment process is necessary to maintain the rights of
citizens).
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the supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not otherwise provided for ... 7
Comparing the language in the Treaty Clause78 with the language
in the Appointments Clause is illuminative. The word "power"
included in the Treaty Clause is noticeably absent from the Ap-
pointments Clause. The President has the power to make treaties
and this power is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.
However, the President does not have the power to make appoint-
ments. Instead, the text requires that both the President and the
Senate act to make appointments. The structure of the text is such
that the President and the Senate each act and these acts together
are the exercise of the appointment power. Moreover, unlike the
Treaty Clause, which requires a vote of two-thirds of the present
Senators, the Senate's advice and consent role in appointing judges
is not specifically articulated. Thus, the text of the Constitution
leaves the Senate greater discretion in its advice and consent duties
to appoint than in its advice and consent duties to make treaties.
Some scholars argue that the text proves the Framers intended
the President to have the primary role in appointments and that the
Senate's role is merely a check to prevent the President from irre-
sponsibly exercising his power.79 One scholar argues:
As the text of the [Appointments Clause] makes explicitly
clear, the power to choose nominees-to "nominate"-is
vested solely in the President. The President also has the
primary role to "appoint," albeit with the advice and consent
of the Senate. The text of the clause itself thus demonstrates
that the role envisioned for the Senate was a much more lim-
ited one than is currently claimed. a
No meaningful explanation is provided for the conclusion that
the text of the Appointments Clause explicitly grants the President
the "primary role to 'appoint."' However, there are at least two
possible arguments. First, the text refers to the President before
the Senate and, thus, the President has the greater share of the ap-
pointment power than the Senate. Mentioning one party before
arother, however, does not necessarily mean that that party wields
mcre power or is more important than the other party. In a sen-
77 U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
78 The Treaty Clause states, "He shall have the Power, by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." Id.
79 See, e.g., John C. Eastman, The Limited Nature of the Senate's Advice and Consent
Role, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 633,640 (2003).
80 Id. (footnote omitted).
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tence with two subjects that perform the same act, one subject
must be mentioned before the other, even where the subjects share
equal value within that sentence.
The second argument is that the Appointments Clause appears
in Article II of the Constitution, the article in which the Constitu-
tion establishes the Executive Branch and its powers." This ar-
gument fails. The Framers split the power between two branches
of the government. There is one article of the Constitution de-
voted to each of these two branches. The Framers wanted a con-
cise and efficient document. 82 The Framers had three choices for
placement of the appointment power: repeat the Appointments
Clause in both Articles I and II; split up the Appointments Clause
and put the Senate's role in Article I and the President's in Article
II; or choose to put the entire clause in either Article I or Article II.
Surely, the Framers had their reasons for placing the Appointments
Clause in Article II other than mere efficiency,83 but efficiency is
certainly why the clause does not also appear in Article I and why
the mere fact that the Appointments Clause is in Article II does not
mean that it is primarily an executive power. Moreover, there are
other circumstances in which the Constitution gives power to one
branch in the article of another. For instance, no one would argue
that the President's veto power is diminished, other than as textu-
ally limited, merely because it appears in Article I rather than Ar-
ticle 11.84
For these reasons, the text supports the conclusion that the
President and the Senate are both charged with exercising the
power to appoint federal judges and that the Constitution does not
grant either party a greater share in that power. Nevertheless, it
must be said that the President or the Senate may have a greater
share of the appointment power simply incident to the nature of
their respective roles in the appointment process. That is, the
81 See MCKEEVER, supra note 72, at 116; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The ex-
ecutive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.").
82 See George Mason, To James Monroe, in 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 1254,
1255 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970) ("[Alnd it is a well known Rule of Construction, that no
Clause or Expression shall be deemed superfluous, or nugatory, which is capable of a fair and
rational Meaning.").
83 One plausible reason is that the major criticism of the Appointments Clause was that it
gave too much power to the Senate. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS
PROCESS 28 (2000). By placing the clause in Article I, this might have assuaged some of those
concerns.
84 Pursuant to Article I:
Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he
approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that house
in which it shall have originated.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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power to nominate may be greater than the power to advise and
consent or vice versa. Again, this difference in potency, if there is
one, is due to the nature of the role, and by no means warrants a
conclusion that the Senate has no substantive power and is merely
to serve as a check on the President's nominating power. This
conclusion is further supported by the Framers' intent, as shown in
the following section.
2. Framers' Intent
Prior to the Constitution's ratification, the issue of how to al-
85locate the power to appoint the judiciary divided the Framers.
There were two sides to the debate. One side argued for the ex-
ecutive branch to hold the power of appointment, while the other
side argued for the legislative branch to hold that power.86 James
Wilson, for instance, adopted the position that favored the execu-
87tive branch, over the legislature, as the selector of federal judges.
Wilson argued that a "single, responsible person" choosing federal
judges is preferred to the legislature because the consequences of
appointments by the "numerous bodies" of the legislature would
likely be "[i]ntrigue, partiality, and concealment." 88  Edward
Rutledge, on the other hand, argued against establishing the ap-
pointment power in the President alone because if one person pos-
sesses that power alone, the threat of abuse is extremely high.89
James Madison recognized both viewpoints and sought a
compromise. 90 He agreed with Wilson, that giving the power to
many would not produce the best judiciary.91 However, Madison
also agreed with Rutledge that the power was too great to give to
one man.92 Preliminarily, he proposed that the Senate would be
the best body to select the judiciary because it is not too small to
easily abuse the authority, and not too large to be hampered by
politics. 93  Roger Sherman and William Pinckney agreed and
adopted the position that the Senate should have the sole power to
85 See Records of the Federal Convention (June 5, 1787), in I THE RECORDS OF THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 119 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). Probably the most interesting
viewpoint was expressed by Benjamin Franklin, who argued that the power to select federal
judges should be given to the lawyers because they would likely select the best among their
peers in order to reduce competition with them. Id.
86 JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OFTHE SENATE 17-18 (1953).
87 Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 85, at 119.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 120.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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appoint the judiciary. 94  Disagreeing, Nathaniel Gorham argued
that because the Senate was composed of multiple members, it
would not be as accountable for substandard appointments as
would a single president. 95 For this reason, Gorham suggested that
the President appoint federal judges with the advice and consent of
the Senate.96
The Convention ultimately adopted Gorham's proposal in the
language of the Appointments Clause. Thus, the Framers com-
promised by establishing an appointments procedure requiring the
cooperation of the President and the Senate.97 They considered the
Appointments Clause to divide the appointment power between the
President and the Senate, giving both parties a significant role in
the process of selecting federal judges. 98 Even Alexander Hamil-
ton, who famously advocated for a strong executive, believed that
the Appointments Clause gave the Senate more power than a mere
rubber stamp to the President:
To what purpose then require the co-operation of the Senate?
I answer that the necessity of their concurrence would have a
powerful, though in general a silent operation. It would be an
excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President,
and would tend greatly to preventing the appointment of unfit
characters from State prejudice, from family connection,
from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity. And,
in addition to this, it would be an efficacious source of stabil-
ity in the administration."
Hamilton argued that the Appointments Clause limits the Senate
insofar as the President always has the power to choose a nomi-
nee.' ° According to Hamilton, even though the Senate may reject
that nominee, the President always has the power to choose an-
other nominee.01 Thus, the fact that the Senate has the advice and
consent power does not diminish the President's power to nomi-
14 Records of the Federal Convention (June 13, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 233 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
95 Records of the Federal Convention (July 18, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 41 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
6 Id.
97 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton) (referring to the cooperation of the
Senate in the appointments process).
98 George Mason, for example, concluded that the Appointments Clause divided the ap-
pointment power into two powers: the power to nominate and the power to consent or not to
consent to that nomination. In Mason's view, the Senate, as a representative of the sovereign
states, was to carefully consider judicial nominees before giving its consent. Mason, supra note
82, at 1255.
99 THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton).
1t01d.
101 Id.
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nate. Yet, as Hamilton observed, the possibility of the Senate re-
jecting a nominee should affect the President's choice. 10 2
James Madison also agreed with this characterization. In
1813, long after ratification, Madison, while speaking before Con-
gress in regard to the appointment of an ambassador to Sweden,
made it clear that the Appointments Clause bestowed considerable
power to the Senate: "[T]he Executive & Senate in the cases of
appointments to Office ... are to be considered as independent of
and co-ordinate with each other. If they agree the appoint-
ments... are made. If the Senate disagrees they fail."'' 0 3 Thus,
the Framers intended their compromise to divide the appointment
power between the President and the Senate, with neither taking a
greater slice of the appointment power pie. Consequently, a claim
arguing that filibusters against judicial nominees violate the Ap-
pointments Clause, under a theory that the Appointments Clause
requires the Senate's acquiescence to the President's nominees
unless the President abuses his discretion, must fail.
B. Advice and Consent-Are Filibusters Inconsistent with the
Senate's Role in the Judicial Appointment Process?
In considering the merits of suits brought against the Senate
alleging that filibusters are unconstitutional, this section first ex-
plores the constitutional scope of the Senate's advice and consent
powers, and then determines whether supermajority requirements
or failure to vote on a nominee are outside of this scope.
1. The Constitutional Scope of Advice and Consent
When the Constitution establishes power in an actor, it gener-
ally defines the outer limits of that power, rather than the precise
rules of the power's execution. That is, the actor exercising con-
stitutional power may exercise a lesser power than that articulated
by the Constitution. But if the actor transgresses the constitutional
limits of his power, that actor has violated the Constitution. This is
true of the Appointments Clause-it establishes the outer limits of
the Senate's role in the appointments context. As long as the Sen-
ate acts within the scope of the Appointments Clause, the exercise
of its advice and consent power is constitutional.
On its face, the Appointments Clause only restricts the Senate
insofar as the President may nominate and the Senate may advise
and consent. For this reason, the text apparently grants the Presi-
2 Id.
1038 THE WRrrINGS OF JAMES MADISON 250-51 (Gaillard Hunter ed., 1900-1910).
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dent and the Senate broad discretion in their capacities. Indeed,
one scholar argues that "the Constitution allows . . . the Senate to
base [its] decisions or actions regarding appointments on whatever
grounds [it] deem[s] appropriate." 104 The text of the Constitution
does not simply preclude either party from appointing judges
without input from the other. It also articulates specific roles for
each party to play in the appointment process.
The text of the Constitution conditions judicial appointments
on the advice and consent of the Senate. Attributing the plain
meaning to the words "advice" and "consent" yields the conclu-
sions that the Constitution allows the members of the Senate to
articulate to the President the characteristics that they would prefer
in his judicial nominees and that the Constitution requires that the
Senate approve of a nominee before he or she may be appointed to
the federal bench. The Oxford English Dictionary defines advice
as "[o]pinion given or offered as to action; counsel. '0 5 The Presi-
dent is not bound by the Senate's advice, but at maximum, the Ap-
pointments Clause allows the Senate to give the President advice
on whom to nominate.10 6 The same dictionary defines consent as
"[t]o agree together, or with another, in opinion or statement; to be
of the same mind."'0 7 The Constitution also requires Senate ap-
proval of the President's nominee. 1°8 The Constitution does not
say what form that approval must take; just that the Senate, as a
collective body, must consent to the appointment of a particular
nominee.1 °9 Since the Rules of Proceedings Clause grants the Sen-
ate broad discretion to make rules of its own procedure, t l0 it logi-
cally follows that the Senate has broad discretion in determining
the procedure for consent in the appointments context.
The purpose of the advice and consent requirement "serves
both to curb executive abuses of appointment power, and to pro-
mote judicious choice of persons for filling offices of the un-
104 GERHARDT, supra note 83, at 38.
105 OXFORD ENGLISH DIcrIONARY 191 (2d ed. 1989). This definition is essentially the
same today as it was at the time of ratification. See Roger J. Miner, Advice and Consent in
Theory and Practice, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1075, 1078 (1992) (explaining that "a dictionary almost
175 years old [in 1992] ... defines 'advice' as 'counsel' and 'instruction.').
106 This is discussed in greater depth infra Part IV.
107 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 105, at 760.
108 This interpretation is supported by Alexander Hamilton. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 76
(Alexander Hamilton).
109 In United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 6 (1892), the Supreme Court stated:
The two houses of Congress are legislative bodies representing larger constituencies.
Power is not vested in any one individual, but in the aggregate of the members who
compose the body, and its action is not the action of any separate member or number
of members, but the action of the body as a whole.
Id. at 7.
n
0See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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ion.""' It only makes sense that the discretion of the Senate
should be confined to furthering this purpose."12  This, of course,
does not mean that Senators violate the Constitution when they act
in ways that objectively appear to contradict this goal." 3  The
standard should be good faith: as long as Senators believe they are
furthering the goals of the Appointments Clause, the constitutional
requirements are satisfied.'1 4 Granted, this limitation only prohib-
its the absurd and most egregious attempts to thwart the appoint-
ments process.115  Consequently, furthering the purpose of requir-
ing advice and consent is a minor limitation on the Senate's discre-
tion in determining how to manifest its consent to an appointment.
Therefore, it has very broad discretion to determine how to mani-
fest its consent to the appointment of the President's judicial nomi-
nees.
2. Are Supermajority Requirements Within the Constitutional Scope
of Advice and Consent?
In May of 2003, Judicial Watch, Inc., a self-described non-
profit educational foundation, 1 6 sued the United States Senate in
federal court,1 17 claiming that "[t]he application of Rule XXII to
[the nominations of Estrada and Owen] ... imposes an additional,
unconstitutional requirement that judicial nominees be confirmed
by a supermajority of 60 votes rather than the simple majority of
51 votes required by Article II, Section 2 of the United States Con-
stitution."' 1 8  Essential to Judicial Watch's argument is the as-
sumption that the Appointments Clause implicitly requires that the
Senate manifest its consent by a simple-majority, up-or-down vote
I Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997).112 See Bailin, 144 U.S. at 5 (holding that the Senate is limited to making rules for its pro-
ceedings that further the purpose the particular proceeding is supposed to serve).
113 Surely, both parties would accuse the other of contradicting this purpose. See supra
notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
114Of course the same would hold true for the President: as long as he, in exercising his
power to nominate, acts in a way that he believes furthers the goal of selecting a competent
judiciary, in a manner as free from personal bias or politics as possible, then his act is consistent
with the Constitution.
115 Examples of an egregious abuse would be a group of Senators blocking a vote on a
nominee for the sole purpose of gaining leverage to pass a bill that they favor or for the sole
purpose of political payback. Even if one of these purposes is truly the sole purpose behind the
obstruction of a nominee's confirmation, usually the obstructionist Senators will claim legiti-
mate reasons for their actions.
116 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1 3, Judicial Watch, Inc., v. United
States Senate, No. 1:03cv01066 (CKK) (D.D.C. May 14,2003).
11 Judicial Watch, Inc., v. United States Senate, No. 1:03cv01066 (CKK) (D.D.C. May 14,
2003).
118 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 27, Judicial Watch, Inc., v. United
States Senate, No. 1:03cv01066 (CKK) (D.D.C. May 14,2003).
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on the fitness of a judicial nominee. However, such a requirement
does not exist.
Under the Appointments Clause, the body of the Senate must
consent to a president's nominee. The Rules of Proceedings
Clause grants the Senate the authority to decide how to express its
consent to a nominee."19 There is nothing in the Constitution limit-
ing the Senate to a simple-majority requirement to express con-
sent. 12  The Senate's method of consent is constitutional as long
as it furthers the purpose of the constitutional requirement of con-
sent 12 and does not violate some other constitutional limitation on
the Senate.
Some argue that filibusters against judicial nominees violate
constitutional limits on Senate power. They contend that the Con-
stitution implicitly requires a simple majority to pass legislation,
change a rule of proceeding, or confirm a nominee.122 This argu-
ment is based on the notion that majority rule is a "fundamental
principle" of democracy. 123 This may be true, but the Framers also
recognized that majoritarianism often leads to unacceptable re-
sults, such as the deprivation of fundamental rights. In Federalist
No. 10, Madison explained the potential problems associated with
majoritarianism: "When a majority is included in a faction, the
form of popular government ... enables it to sacrifice to its ruling
passion or interest both for the public good and the rights of other
citizens.' 24  Madison further explained the evils of a democracy
based solely on simple-majority rule:
A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be
felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert
result from the form of government itself; and there is noth-
ing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or
an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies
119 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
120 Under Ballin, the Senate is probably prohibited from requiring less than a simple major-
ity for consent. See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 6, 6 (1892) ("[T]he general rule of all
parliamentary bodies is that, when a quorum is present, the act of a majority of the quorum is
the act of the body.").
121 See supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text.
122 See, e.g., Benjamin Lieber & Patrick Brown, Note, On Supermajorities and the Consti-
tution, 83 GEo. L.J. 2347, 2348 (1995) (arguing that Article I of the Constitution "implicitly
endorses simple majority voting requirements").
123 Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Provisions in the Constitution: The Framers,
The Federalist Papers and the Reinforcement of a Fundamental Principle, 8 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 363, 364-65 (1998); see also Akhil Reed Ahmir, The Central Meaning of Republi-
can Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U.
COLO. L. REv. 749, 749 (1994) (arguing that Article IV of the Constitution, the provision guar-
anteeing a Republican form of government, supports the assumption that underlying the Consti-
tution is a requirement of simple-majority rule).
'
24 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have
ever been found incompatible with personal security or the
rights of property; and have in general been as short in their
lives as they have been violent in their deaths.125
As a consequence of this foresight, the Constitution is replete with
mechanisms intended to temper "the tyranny of the majority."' 126
The Framers sought to carefully balance majoritarianism and pro-
tection of minority interests. Thus, it does not follow that for
every constitutional silence exists an implicit simple-majority re-
quirement.
In fact, the stronger argument is that where there is a serious
threat from a reckless majority, a supermajority requirement
should be imposed to protect strong minority interests. Selecting
the judiciary is an area in which a majority may "sacrifice to its
ruling passion or interest both for the public good and the rights of
other citizens" by recklessly installing an extremist judiciary. 127
This is exactly what the Framers feared would happen if the task
of selecting the judiciary were left entirely to the President.128 By
including the Senate in the process, the Framers intended to temper
the inevitable "spirit of favoritism in the President"1 29 and to
"cool" the political heat underlying his nominations. 30  Conse-
quently, not only is a supermajority requirement for consent sanc-
tioned by the Constitution, but a supermajority requirement also
tempers the "tyranny of the majority" and, therefore, is more likely
to produce an independent judiciary. For these reasons, a chal-
lenge to the filibusters based on the theory that a supermajority
requirement for consent violates the Appointments Clause must
fail.
3. Under the Appointments Clause, Must the Senate Actually Vote on
Every Judicial Nominee?
Some argue that the filibustering Senators have violated the
Appointments Clause by depriving judicial nominees of an up-or-
down vote.' 3' Those who make this claim rely on the assumption
'2 Id.
126 King, supra note 123, at 365 ("[W]hile popular sovereignty was to be the moral founda-
tion of the new government, its Constitutional architecture was replete with arrangements de-
signed to counter the 'tyranny of the majority' problem.").
1
27 
THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
128 See Records of the Federal Convention (July 18, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 42 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
129 THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton).
130 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
131 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Calls for Action on Judicial
Nominees (Aug. 1, 2003) (arguing that filibusters against judicial nominees are "unfaithful to
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that the Appointments Clause requires an up-or-down vote on
every one of the President's nominees. However, the Appoint-
ments Clause contains no such requirement. Nothing in the Ap-
pointments Clause requires that the Senate do anything. Rather,
the Appointments Clause conditions the appointment of a nominee
on the Senate's advice and consent and, thus, only requires the
Senate to act if a nominee is to be appointed to the federal bench.
If the Senate does not act on the nomination, then the Senate sim-
ply has not consented. Under the Appointments Clause the Senate
has the discretion to vote or not vote. Just like a claim charging
that the filibusters against judicial nominees violate the Appoint-
ments Clause by requiring a supermajority Senate approval for
consent should fail on the merits, so should a claim charging that
filibusters violate the Appointments Clause by depriving a nomi-
nee of an up-or-down vote.
IV. THE BETrER SOLUTION TO THE FILIBUSTER PROBLEM:
THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE SENATE'S CONSTITUTIONAL
PRENOMINATION ADVICE ROLE
Aside from being either politically or legally infeasible to im-
plement, the previous proposals have something else in common:
they focus on the postnomination consent aspect of the Senate's
role and seek to remove the filibuster from the repertoire of the
disgruntled minority in the advice and consent context. Even if
those opposed to filibusters against judicial nominations were suc-
cessful in implementing one of these proposed solutions, the oppo-
sition to the nominee still has a strong incentive to use other means
to block confirmation, such as filibustering legislation to either
delay a vote on the contentious nomination or as a means of lever-
age to force the President to withdraw the nomination. Thus, these
proposals will do nothing more than intensify the confirmation bat-
tles. More importantly, none of these proposals goes to the root of
the problem: the communication breakdown between the President
and the Senate, particularly between the President and those Sena-
tors most likely to oppose his nominees. This section explains the
nature of this communication breakdown and argues that the real
solution to the filibuster problem is to reintroduce the Senate's
prenomination advice function.
the Senate's constitutional responsibility to vote on judicial nominees"), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/08120030801-4.htnl.
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A. Communication Breakdown: The Underlying
Cause of the Filibuster Problem
The filibuster problem has not occurred in a vacuum. The
root cause of the filibuster problem is the absence of prenomina-
tion communication between the President and Senators who op-
pose his nominees. In general, filibusters and other heated battles
between the parties are more likely to occur when the government
is closely divided between parties and ideologies. 32  Moreover,
filibusters against judicial nominees are more likely to occur when
the two political parties do not work together, whether between
Republicans and Democrats within the Senate or between Senators
of one party and the President of another. It merely takes common
sense to realize that if one party unilaterally backs a nominee that
the other party staunchly opposes, trouble will ensue. To make
matters worse, when there is an extreme ideological divide in
Washington, the parties are less likely to work together for a
smooth confirmation process. This is the cycle of communication
breakdown. To overcome the escalation of the confirmation bat-
tles, and to end the filibusters against nominees, both parties must
work together to select judges, and this cooperation must start be-
fore the selection of a nominee.13
3
B. Importance of the Senate's Prenomination Advice Role
The Constitution provides that the Senate may condition the
confirmation of a president's nominee on the President providing
an opportunity for the Senate to offer prenomination advice. To be
sure, this idea does not enjoy unanimous support. Some argue that
the Constitution does not allow a prenomination advice role for the
Senate.134 They argue that the word "advice" in advice and con-
sent is either consumed by the notion of consent and is essentially
meaningless on its own, 135 or that it merely means that the Senate
may advise the President as to whether the position needs to be
132 See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 20, at 16 (explaining that extreme partisanship within
the Senate is a major factor for the increase in filibusters in recent years).
133 This does not mean that the President loses his nomination power. The President ulti-
mately has the power to pick the nominee; it just may not be his first choice. Moreover, this
does not mean that the President must pick the nominee favored by the Senators of the opposing
political party. Because the opposition generally approves the vast majority of a president's
nominees, the President must simply temper his choice to one that is more palatable to the op-
posing Senators. See 149 CONG. REC. S10,230 (daily ed. July 30, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Leahy citing the fact that only 3.4% of President George W. Bush's nominees have been
blocked by the Senate Democrats).
34 See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 79, at 645.
135 See id. at 646.
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filled at all. 136 However, an examination of the text and history
shows that the Constitution conditions the appointment of nomi-
nees on both the prenomination advice of the Senate as well as its
confirmation of that nominee.
1. The Constitutional Significance of Advice
The text offers important clues about the significance of the
Senate's power to advise. The very fact that the word "advice"
appears in the Appointments Clause is itself significant. The
Framers were attempting to draft a concise and efficient docu-
ment, 137 and they went to great pains to draft an Appointments
Clause that contained just the right checks and balances to ensure a
competent and independent judiciary.1 38 Surely, they did not go
through such a tedious process only to sloppily draft the Appoint-
ments Clause. Logically, then, the fact that the Framers included
"advice" and "consent" is evidence that the Framers intended the
Senate to perform two functions. That is, the document does not
merely allow or require that the Senate approve or disapprove of a
president's nominee, but also allows or requires some senatorial
involvement in the nomination process.
George Mason was the only Framer to address the role of ad-
vice in the Appointments Clause. His writing supports the notion
that the Senate enjoys the privilege of offering prenomination ad-
vice to the President regarding nominations. In 1792, Mason
wrote:
The Word "Advice" here clearly relates in the Judgment of
the Senate on the Expediency or Inexpediency of the Meas-
ure, or Appointment; and the Word "Consent" to their Ap-
probation or Disapprobation of the Person nominated; other-
wise the word Advice has no Meaning at all-and it is a well
known Rule of Construction, that no Clause or Expression
shall be deemed superfluous, or nugatory, which is capable of
a fair and rational Meaning.
1 39
Thus, according to Mason, advice is a separate power from the
power to consent and "the Senate is constitutionally entitled to
136 See John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirma-
tion Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEx. L. REV. 633, 644 (1993).
137 See Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 489 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[Tihe Framers
chose their language with precision.").
1
38 See generally 1-4 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand
ed., 1966) (detailing the records of the constitutional convention, which show the painstaking
process used by the Framers to develop just the right checks and balances).
139 Mason, supra note 82, at 1255.
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give [nonbinding] advice to a president on whom as well as what
kinds of persons he should nominate to certain posts."'14
Other critics of prenomination advice argue that it would strip
the President of his power to nominate. 141  To construe the Ap-
pointments Clause as conditioning appointments on prenomination
advice does not lead to Senate infringement on a power solely re-
served to the President. The power to advise is not the power to
control whom the President nominates. Advice does not mean
force. 42 Advice to the President regarding whom to nominate, in
the true sense of the word, means that the Senate may tell the
President whom it is likely to confirm or not confirm, or what
qualities-professional, political, demographic, or otherwise-a
nominee should possess to ensure confirmation, but the President
need not heed this advice. 143  Thus, even if the Senate has a
prenomination role in the judicial appointment process, the Presi-
dent still maintains his sole discretion as to whom to nominate. 44
The advantage is that if the President consults with the Senate be-
fore making his choice, he can gauge ahead of time whether his
nominee will survive the Senate's consent process.
Furthermore, throughout much of the nation's history, the
Senate has indeed advised the President on judicial nominations
and presidents have welcomed such advice. For instance:
In 1932, President Hoover let it be known that he would like
to choose a noncontroversial western Republican as the suc-
cessor to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. But the chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, George W. Norris of Ne-
braska, made it plain to the President that he and other mem-
140GERHARDT, supra note 83, at 33; see also David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The
Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1495 (1992) (ar-
guing that Mason's comments support their view that the Constitution assigns "two distinct
roles to the Senate-an advisory role before the nomination has occurred and a reviewing func-
tion after the fact"). Some commentators argue that Mason is simply saying that the Senate
should first decide whether a position even needs to be filled by an appointment. See, e.g.,
McGinnis, supra note 136, at 644. However, as one scholar puts it:
It makes little sense to think that the term "advice" had to be added to the Appoint-
ments Clause to allow the Senate to raise a specific objection to a president's at-
tempt to fill an office not yet authorized by it, because the Senate could simply re-
fuse to "consent" to any nomination until it had determined whether or not the posi-
tion should be filled. The need for the Senate to offer such "advice" would be ex-
tremely rare, given that the framers fully expected the specific offices to which the
nomination and confirmation powers would apply would be left to the discretion of
and established by Congress.
GERHARDT, supra note 83, at 32-33.
141 See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 79, at 645.
142 See supra note 105 and accompanying text (defining "advice").
113 Charles Mathias, Jr., Advice and Consent: The Role of the United States Senate in the
Judicial Selection Process, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 200, 202 (1987).
144 THE FEDERALIST No. 76 (Alexander Hamilton).
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bers of the committee would insist on a distinguished succes-
sor in the Holmes mold. And Senator Borah from Idaho,
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, repeat-
edly called for the nomination of Benjamin Cardozo [from
New York]. After a search of several weeks, Hoover nomi-
nated Cardozo. 14
5
In addition, in 1869, a majority of the Senate signed a petition re-
questing that President Grant nominate Edwin Stanton for an ap-
pointment to the Supreme Court. 46 Grant obliged and the Senate
confirmed Stanton shortly thereafter. 47 Thus, besides the text and
the writings of George Mason, the practical history of judicial ap-
pointments demonstrates that the Constitution imposed on the Sen-
ate the power to offer prenomination advice to the President.
2. Applying Advice to the Filibuster Problem
The Constitution conditions the appointment of judicial nomi-
nees on the Senate's prenomination advice, but how will the rein-
troduction of this practice solve the filibuster problem? The an-
swer is obvious: the advice function, when exercised, forces the
President to cooperate with the Senate. If he ignores its advice and
nominates someone whom members of the Senate have vowed to
fight, the President has no one to blame but himself if a battle en-
sues. 14 8 However, if the President welcomes the advice of the Sen-
ate, "[sluch consultation would . . . work to the advantage of both
parties in that it could lead to the development of some consensus
(or the reduction of some tension) between the two branches and
the opportunity for the President and the Senate to check each
other's judgments in this important area." 149  The President, by
candidly articulating to the Senate and the public what he seeks in
a nominee, and by encouraging the Senate to do the same, will al-
most certainly ensure a smooth confirmation process.'
50
145 Advice and Consent on Supreme Court Nominations Before the S. Subcomm. on the
Separation of Powers, 94th Cong. 2 (1976) (statement of Senator Edward Kennedy). The story
is that Hoover had a list of ten nominees, with Cardozo number ten. The Senate saw the list and
convinced Hoover to turn his list upside down and nominate Cardozo. See Strauss & Sunstein,
supra note 140, at 1501.
146Advice and Consent on Supreme Court Nominations Before the S. Subcomm. on the
Separation of Powers, 94th Cong. 2 (1976) (statement of Senator Edward Kennedy).
147 Id.
148 GERHARDT, supra note 83, at 33.
1
49 Id. at 34.
iOSee HICKOK, supra note 70, at 52 (arguing that presidents can "do something to im-
prove the confirmation process" by telling "the American people and the members of the Senate
what he seeks in a judge... and encourage candor and honesty on the Senate's part").
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Does this mean that the burden of taking the first step to end-
ing the filibuster problem falls on the President's shoulders? In a
word, yes. If the burden is on the Senate to reintroduce advice, it
may only do so forcefully, which will just extend the filibuster
problem indefinitely. Specifically, the only way for the Senate to
institute the advice process is to demand that the President give it
an opportunity to give prenomination advice. If the President re-
fuses, those Senators are justified in blocking the confirmation of
that nominee.' 51 Consequently, the filibuster problem will rear its
ugly head yet again.
Future presidents can easily avoid filibuster problems by ar-
ticulating their requirements in judges and seeking the input from
the Senate, particularly those Senators likely to oppose the nomi-
nees. Admittedly, it is difficult to imagine President George W.
Bush taking the initiative to engage the Senate Democrats in a
prenomination dialogue,152 and it is hard to imagine Senate De-
mocrats being receptive to such an attempt. 53  Since the Senate
has the constitutional authority to demand providing input, and
then to deny confirmation if that opportunity to give input is re-
fused or if the President ignores the input, it is up to the President
alone to take that leap and reengage the Senate by asking for
prenomination advice. Moreover, taking the first step to reengage
the filibustering minority in the Senate will reap political rewards
for the President. He will be seen as a bridge-builder by the
American people, rather than a bridge-burner; he will demonstrate
his ability to be a uniter rather than a divider. 15
4
CONCLUSION
The filibusters against judicial nominees exacerbate backlogs
in federal courts and delay citizens their day in court. They disrupt
government business and deflect attention from issues more wor-
thy of attention. Proposed solutions to the filibuster problem that
seek to remove filibusters as a tactic in the judicial appointments
context are either politically or legally infeasible to implement,
151 Appointments are conditioned on the Senate giving its advice, so if the Senate insists on
its power to give the President prenomination advice and the President refuses, presumably the
President's nominee cannot be appointed.
15 2 See Victory for a Smear, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2003, at A20 (explaining that in the con-
text of judicial appointments, President Bush is "mulish[ly] unwilling[] to even listen to reason-
able Democratic concerns").
153 See id. (explaining that in the past year, Democrats have been "continually escalating
the [confirmation] battle and smearing [some of the nominees]").
5 See Dana Milbank, W is for Warm and Fuzzy, George Bush Injects His Conservatism
with a Liberal Dose of Compassion, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2000, at C01 (quoting then candi-
date George W. Bush as famously claiming he's "a uniter not a divider").
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and simply do not address the underlying problem: the communi-
cation breakdown between the President and the Senate. The only
way to stop the filibusters is to promote communication between
the President and the filibustering Senators, which requires the
President to take the initiative and allow these Senators to exercise
their power to offer prenomination advice.
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